Abstract: In February 2011, the dramatic ouster of Hosni Mubarak threw into the spotlight the U.S. policy of granting comparatively generous and unconditional aid to the Egyptian regime at a time when the strategic rationale for such aid had become less obvious and calls for inserting human rights considerations into foreign aid allocations more prominent.
Hypothesis IIIb is that U.S. representatives from districts with a substantial share of Arab-, Muslim-and African-American constituencies will oppose such efforts. simply to prevent the discussion of politically sensitive issues. While the circumstances and implications of specific amendments differ, the overall effects can be expected to be uniform for the oil, defense and agriculture lobbies across all models because reallocations, cuts and conditionality are all similar in their negative effects on their economic interests.
Hypothesis IVa thus is that lawmakers who receive a higher share of their campaign contributions from the oil, defense and agriculture lobbies are more hesitant to change the status quo in the U.S.-Egyptian aid relationship.
Hypothesis IVb is that lawmakers who receive a higher share of their campaign contributions from the pro-Israel lobby are more likely to support such changes in cases where there is a clear link to the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
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